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Getting It Right by Getting It Wrong: How the Supreme
Court Helped Healthcare Reform by Incorrectly
Applying the Standard of Review in Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers of America v. Walsh
I. INTRODUCTION
Healthcare reform has proven to be a puzzling creature. As the
number of citizens without healthcare coverage swells, and the specter of
increasing healthcare costs looms large in the minds of nearly every
person, it is fairly obvious why the topic of healthcare reform is a
powerful and poignant issue today. Nearly forty-six million American
citizens do not have any healthcare coverage, including coverage from
public assistance programs such as Medicaid or Medicare.1
Complementing this staggering number is a wide consensus amongst
Americans that the system for providing healthcare coverage is broken
and needs to be fixed.2 And yet, despite overwhelming recognition that
change is required, reform has come falteringly, and has been largely
ineffective.
This Note seeks to address one area of healthcare reform by
examining the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America v. Walsh3
(hereafter called “Walsh”) in terms of its contribution to the healthcare
reform debate. I first consider the issues that gave rise to the suit filed by
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (hereafter called
“PhRMA”), including an explanation of the Maine Rx Program, which
stands at the core of the dispute. After a close examination of the
reasoning set forth by the opinions of the Walsh decision, I propose that
the plurality’s approach to addressing the case is procedurally unsound,
given the controlling standard of review pointed out by the dissent.
Nevertheless, the plurality’s decision to hold in favor of Maine Rx, even

1. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COM., INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH
INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE U.S.: 2004, 16 (2005).
2. One public opinion poll placed healthcare reform as the fourth “most important problem
for the government to address,” above taxes, the budget, terrorism, national security, education, and
crime. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, March/April2005 Health Poll Report Survey,
Apr. 2005, at 4, available at http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/March-April-2005-KaiserHealth-Poll-Report-Toplines.pdf.
3. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 (2003).
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if only in the context of reviewing a preliminary injunction, is desirable
because it ultimately provides support for the proposition that human
lives are of greater value than lost profits. Furthermore, the Court’s
reaffirmation of presumptive constitutionality in the case of legislation
involving Medicaid programs may aid effective healthcare reform by
providing more ammunition to state legislatures as they assert their
position as the proper forums for resolution of healthcare problems.4
Finally, this Note looks at subsequent treatment of the case in remand
proceedings, noting especially the implications of the Walsh decision for
the future, and concludes that the plurality’s “inadvertence” may well aid
healthcare reform more than many intentional undertakings.
II. MEDICAID, MAINE RX AND PRIOR APPROVAL PLANS
A. Medicaid5
Medicaid itself has long been a very controversial subject.6 Indeed,
one author has observed that while the Medicare program has always
enjoyed solid popularity, the Medicaid program has endured a tenuous
and difficult existence since its passage as part of the Social Security Act
in 1965.7 Medicaid’s controversy is presumably due to public concerns
about rising costs, as well as a certain apprehensiveness about socialized
healthcare assistance programs.8
As set up by the “Medicaid Act,”9 Medicaid is a federally-subsidized
healthcare coverage option for certain qualifying individuals, wherein
each State administers its own version of the program. States largely
determine for themselves what benefits to grant, and set eligibility
requirements for determining which individuals will be covered, subject
to certain federally imposed threshold requirements.10 Under those
requirements, state Medicaid programs must extend healthcare coverage

4. I recognize that whether the states truly are the best forums for healthcare reform is a
premise with which some might take issue. There are many compelling arguments for why states are
better able to deal with healthcare reform than the federal government, but they are outside the
immediate scope of this work, and I will not address them here. For a well-crafted treatment of five
such arguments, see Carol S. Weissert’s article, Promise and Perils of State-Based Road to
Universal Health Insurance in the U.S., 7 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 42 (2004) (discussing
healthcare reform in terms of moving towards universal health insurance).
5. This summary of the Medicaid system is distilled from BARRY R. FURROW ET AL.,
HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 772–76 (West 2004) (1987).
6. FURROW ET AL., supra note 5, at 772.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 et seq. (2000).
10. FURROW ET AL., supra note 5, at 773–75.
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to citizens who are aged, blind, or permanently and totally disabled, and
whose income is below or very near to the federal poverty line.11
Agencies administering the Medicaid programs term this group of
mandatory beneficiaries as the “categorically needy.”12 In addition to
providing for the “categorically needy,” States may choose to (and often
do), extend eligibility for Medicaid coverage to a broader group based
upon calculations of financial need.13 In this manner, States are given
considerable leeway in defining the formulae used to calculate eligibility
for Medicaid coverage.14 Historically, as long as the States crafted plans
that extended benefits to the “categorically needy,” the federal
government remained aloof from most other aspects of administration.15
Today, States do cover those with pressing medical needs, whose
incomes, according to federally proscribed guidelines, are significantly
depressed.16 However, States also cover a significant portion of
individuals and families who would not otherwise be eligible under the
federal minimum standards.17
Drug benefits under State Medicaid plans, like other covered
benefits, are extended to qualifying applicants via the eligibility schemes
of the various states, as described above.18 At first, there were only
minimal federal guidelines for States to follow, mostly setting upper
limits on state spending for prescription benefits.19 States took the liberty
of instituting various regulatory plans to administer drug benefits to
Medicaid beneficiaries. Many of these plans attempted to control
increased drug spending, which was widely viewed as the product of
rising drug costs.20 One such program was the so-called “prior approval
plan.”21 If a State chose to place a drug on a prior approval plan, all
doctors prescribing that medication within that state had to obtain prior
11. Id. at 773–74. The federal poverty level is determined by reference to the size of a
household, that household’s income, and location of the household in either the forty-eight
contiguous states, Alaska, or Hawaii. The federal poverty level for a single-member household
located within the contiguous states in 2006 is $9,800.00 per year. For a household of four similarly
located, the 2006 federal poverty level is $20,000.00 per year. Annual Update of the HHS Poverty
Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. 3848 (Jan. 24, 2006).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i).
13. FURROW ET AL., supra note 5, at 774–75.
14. See id. at 774, 779–81 (discussing state discretion in extending coverage to certain groups
of applicants and in providing certain benefits).
15. See id.
16. Id. at 774–75.
17. Id. at 774.
18. See id. at 773–75.
19. Walsh, 538 U.S. at 651 (quoting M. Ford, Congressional Research Service Report to
Congress, Medicaid: Reimbursement for Outpatient Prescription Drugs, CRS-1 (Mar. 7, 1991)).
20. See id.
21. See id. at 651–52.
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approval from a state agency before the prescription could be filled.22
Such cost-saving measures had been implicitly sustained for quite some
time, and without much controversy.23 The first prior approval plans
were simply approved by the Secretary of Health as a part of the States’
Medicaid plans as a whole, rather than addressed in their own right. 24
This is presumably because the goal of these reforming states was to
control Medicaid costs and they were not at that time directly regulated
under the Medicaid Act. 25
Today, the Medicaid drug benefit is heavily supported by a provision
of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990,26 which requires
drug manufacturers to grant a rebate on all drugs purchased for Medicaid
patients.27 In return for the rebate, Congress forbids the States from
excluding the drugs of participating manufacturers from their programs’
coverage.28 However, States are still allowed to place certain restrictions
on the drugs of participating manufacturers, foremost amongst these
being the prior approval plans, which Congress explicitly endorses.29
Such regulatory plans were ostensibly ratified by Congress by
amendment to the Medicaid Act.30 At present, States’ prior approval
plans are specifically authorized by statute, so long as the States seeking
to institute such plans maintain a reliable, quick, and efficient way of
obtaining approval.31
Given Medicaid’s turbulent and controversial development,32 it is
clear that the roles of the federal government and the States are often
undefined, and there is substantial overlap between their efforts and
policies, which frequently results in confusion, waste, and most
22. See id.
23. See id. at 652.
24. The Secretary of Health is charged by statute with the duty of reviewing state Medicaid
plans for compliance with federal mandates. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(b).
25. Walsh, 538 U.S. at 652.
26. 104 Stat. 1388, 13880 143–59 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396r–8).
27. “The rebate on a ‘single source drug’ or an ‘innovator multiple source drug’ is the
difference between the manufacturer’s average price and its ‘best price,’ or 15.1% of the average
manufacturer price, whichever is greater. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396r-8(c)(1), (2). The rebate for other drugs
is 11.1% of the average manufacturer price. See [42 U.S.C.] § 1396r-8(c)(3).” Walsh, 538 U.S. at
652.
28. “[O]nce a drug manufacturer enters into a rebate agreement, the law requires the State to
provide coverage for that drug under its plan . . . .” Id.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(d).
30. Until recently, it was unclear whether placing a drug on a prior approval plan could be
done unilaterally by the states. However, in the aftermath of Walsh, the Secretary of the Department
of Health and Human Services, who is charged with the task of administering federal involvement
in, and supervision of, the Medicaid program, has suggested that such an action now needs approval
from the Secretary. See Walsh, 538 U.S. at 662 n.30.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(d)(1)(A).
32. See supra text accompanying notes 6–8.
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significantly, gaps in coverage.33 The mixture of regulatory oversight and
independence has left many deficiencies and many questions about what
States may do to reform their healthcare programs to help residents with
no healthcare coverage without endangering continued federal Medicaid
subsidization. A large portion of the American population has no
healthcare coverage at all, and, presumably, an even larger portion has
inadequate coverage.34 States are left on their own to determine how to
address the healthcare needs of this substantial population. One
particularly contentious issue is how States may use their Medicaid
programs in connection with other State programs to solve this problem.
This is a prominent point in the Walsh decision.
B. What is the Maine Rx Program?
Many individuals who do not have any healthcare coverage at all
also have no way to offset staggering prescription drug costs. But the
problem is much broader than just those who have no coverage. While
many people have some form of health insurance, these same people do
not always have adequate drug benefits; indeed, many have no drug
benefits whatsoever.35 The Maine Rx Program36 (hereafter called “Maine
Rx”) is one State’s attempt to use certain aspects of the Medicaid
program to fill a gap left by Medicaid coverage.
33. The complete absence of specific provisions concerning prescription drug coverage
between 1965 and 1990 serves as an ideal example of how the development of Medicaid has largely
been an ad hoc enterprise, which development has seen both the creation of, and subsequent
attending to, gaps in coverage. See Walsh, 538 U.S. at 651.
34. 45.8 million Americans were without any healthcare coverage for all or part of the year in
2004. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH
INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE U.S.: 2004, 16 (2005). Additionally, a recent survey revealed that
61% of American adults who have had problems paying medical bills are covered by insurance, and
a significant number of people [roughly 17% of American non-senior adults] reported not being able
to pay for healthcare at all at some point in 2005, despite having some form of healthcare insurance.
THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, HARVARD SCHOOL OF PUBLIC HEALTH & USA
TODAY,
Health
Care
Costs
Survey,
Aug.
2005,
at
3,
available
at
http://www.kff.org/newsmedia/upload/7371.pdf.
35. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, US DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS:
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE: 1996, at 1 (1997) (stating that in 1996, roughly 84.4% of the
American population was covered by some type of insurance continuously throughout the entire
year); THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, Prescription Drug Trends, Oct. 2004, at *2,
available
at
http://www.kff.org/rxdrugs/upload/Prescription-Drug-Trends-October-2004UPDATE.pdf. (“In 1996, 23% of nonelderly Americans [excludes children and Medicare eligible
individuals] had no drug coverage (more recent data are not available), including those without any
health insurance for some or all of the year”). Cf THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION,
Health Care Costs Survey, supra note 34, at 7 (“Nearly one-quarter (24%) of Americans report that
they or someone in their household did not fill a prescription, cut pills or skipped doses in the past
year because of the cost”).
36. Codified as currently amended at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2681 et seq. (West
Supp. 2005).
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In an effort to provide some relief from rising drug costs to Maine
residents, the Maine legislature created Maine Rx to grant a widereaching drug discount. Under Maine Rx, residents of Maine who do not
have a comparable drug benefit could qualify for enrollment in the
program and would thereafter be eligible37 to receive a discount roughly
equivalent to wholesale pricing. The program calls for Maine’s
Commissioner of Human Services to negotiate voluntary manufacturer
rebates with pharmaceutical companies.38 These rebates are to be at least
as large as those that are granted to the federal government under the
Medicaid program.39 Maine then redistributes the rebates to participating
pharmacies within the state, which sells the drugs at their discounted
prices to enrollees.40
If a pharmaceuticals manufacturer chooses not to participate in the
program, the fact of such non-participation would be deemed “public
knowledge,” and Maine could “publicize” the name of the nonparticipating company, and the fact of its non-participation to
practitioners, pharmacies, and the general public.41 In addition, Maine
could also place the non-participating drug(s)42 on a prior approval plan
for Maine’s Medicaid population.43 As discussed above, such an action
means that practitioners would need to obtain prior approval from the
State before prescriptions for the non-participating drug would be filled
for Medicaid patients.44 However, Maine also maintains rules exempting
certain necessary drugs from the prior approval plan penalties, to ensure
that Medicaid patients requiring essential medications are not unduly

37. Under the original Maine Rx statute, there was some controversy as to whether the
program was open to all residents, or if it constrained enrollment in some way. Maine argued that
enrollment was self-policing, as it would make no sense to use the program in lieu of a better private
drug benefit, should one be available. Walsh, 538 U.S. at 655 n.14. Nevertheless, PhRMA argued
that the bald language of the statute left enrollment wide open to all residents, thus requiring
preemption by the Medicaid Act. Id. At that time, the statute read: “‘Qualified resident’ means a
resident of the State who has obtained from the department a Maine Rx enrollment card.” ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2681(2)(F) (West Supp. 2002). This point was important for the dissent’s
position that the statute did not facially promote any Medicaid related purpose, but is otherwise
irrelevant to the topic of this Note. See Walsh, 538 U.S. at 685–90.
38. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2681(4) (West Supp. 2002).
39. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2681(3)–(4)(C) (West Supp. 2002). See supra text
accompanying note 27.
40. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2681(5)–(6) (West Supp. 2002).
41. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2681(7) (West Supp. 2002) (re-codified as ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2681(7-A) (West Supp. 2005)).
42. It is conceivable that a pharmaceutical company would agree to grant a rebate on one
drug and not another. See id.
43. See id.
44. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2681(7) (West Supp. 2002) (re-codified as ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2681(7-A) (West Supp. 2005)); supra text accompanying note 22.
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burdened by the plan.45
As can be seen from the prior discussion of early Medicaid
provisions,46 the device itself that Maine uses under Maine Rx to
encourage manufacturers to grant rebates is nothing new. In fact, the
Court in Walsh notes specifically that even before prior approval plans
fell under the rubric of federal oversight, such regulatory tools were very
common.47 Before any litigation concerning Maine Rx began, prior
approval plans had long been regarded as a perfectly acceptable way for
States to control healthcare costs.48 The question at the heart of the
litigation that spawned Walsh is simply whether it is acceptable to use
them in connection with non-Medicaid as well as Medicaid-related
healthcare purposes.49
III. HISTORY OF THE CASE
A. Facts
1. Objections by pharmaceuticals manufacturers
Unsurprisingly, pharmaceuticals manufacturers vigorously fought
Maine Rx before it was even passed into law.50 There are many points
about the program that pharmaceuticals manufacturers could find
objectionable, not least amongst these being the effect that Maine Rx
inevitably has on their bottom line. Maine Rx, ultimately, is little more
than a cost shifting device, in that it reallocates the cost of providing
Maine residents with prescription drugs to the drug companies
themselves. It would be extremely dubious to say that Maine Rx does
anything but force drug companies to eat some profits in order to
continue doing business in Maine.
Although reduced profits are most likely the single greatest
compelling factor driving the subsequent litigation that has surrounded
Maine Rx since its inception, it is not the only complaint that
pharmaceutical companies have against the program. During legislative
consideration of Maine Rx, PhRMA and other related groups took out
full-page ads in Maine’s largest newspapers, “calling the [program] ‘a
45. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2681(11), (13)–(14) (West Supp. 2002); Rules of the
Dep’t of Human Serv., § 15, Maine Rx Program (West Supp. 2002).
46. See supra text accompanying notes 20–31.
47. Walsh, 538 U.S. at 652.
48. See id.
49. See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Comm’r, No. Civ. 00-157-B-H, 2000 WL
34290605, at *1 (D. Me. Oct. 26, 2000).
50. See infra text accompanying note 51.
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cure that’s worse than the disease.’”51 PhRMA claimed that the bill
would improperly restrict which drugs healthcare providers could
prescribe, and could force Medicaid recipients and others to “take
cheaper, less-effective medicines.”52 Additionally, the pharmaceuticals
manufacturers argued that the program would also “have a chilling effect
on research and the development of new drugs.”53 The validity of such
contentions aside, PhRMA used these points extensively to bolster
arguments against the program in its initial complaint filed in federal
court.54
In Walsh, PhRMA argues that Maine Rx should be permanently
enjoined from taking effect for two reasons. First, PhRMA claims that
provisions of Maine Rx conflict with the Medicaid Act by “constrict[ing]
the flow of prescription drug benefits to Congress’s intended
beneficiaries of Medicaid.”55 To support its arguments in court, PhRMA
uses much of the same hypothesizing and doom-casting it had conducted
during ratification of the program during legislative consideration of
Maine Rx. In particular, PhRMA calls upon expert witnesses to support
its motion for injunction, who testify that, in their opinion, “prior
authorization . . . for the purpose of influencing the manufacturer’s
pricing behavior in another program . . . will lead to drugs being
prescribed that are less safe and efficacious.”56 Furthermore, PhRMA
asserts that there is no Medicaid-related purpose advanced by the
program, as it is merely a front for “holding Medicaid patients’
prescription drug benefits hostage to the State’s fundraising efforts on
behalf of [non-Medicaid eligible residents of Maine].”57 PhRMA
concludes that since Maine Rx seeks to apply regulations that affect
Medicaid recipients, and yet offers no Medicaid-related purpose within
its text to suggest that it works in concert with Medicaid, it must
therefore be in tension with the federal Medicaid statute.58 PhRMA calls
for the Court to permanently enjoin Maine Rx because, under the

51. A. J. Higgins, Drug Bill Deal Reached: Compromise Aims to Cut Prices for Uninsured,
BANGOR DAILY NEWS, May 11, 2000, at 1, available at http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=
53679436&sid1&Fmt=3&clientld=9338&VName=PQD.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., Walsh 538 U.S. at 656–57 (citing PhRMA’s executives and experts presenting
similar arguments in their affidavits to the district court).
55. Brief of Petitioner at 14, Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 (2003)
(No. 01-188).
56. Walsh, 538 U.S. at 657 (quoting affidavit of Dr. Howell of SmithKline Beecham
Corporation).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 662.
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Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution,59 federal law must prevail
over state law when both attempt to regulate the same area.60 Thus, says
PhRMA, Maine Rx is pre-empted by the federal Medicaid Act and must
be enjoined.61
Second, PhRMA alleges that Maine Rx must be permanently
enjoined because it tramples on the dormant Commerce Clause powers
reserved to Congress62 by attempting to regulate commercial actions that
occur almost exclusively extraterritorially, and by favoring Maine
citizens over citizens of other states at the expense of manufacturers
located exclusively out-of-state.63 It is important to note that PhRMA
argues the rebate program is not voluntary, because penalties are
attached to non-participation.64 Thus, PhRMA views Maine Rx as
coercive, rather than participatory. In support of this view, PhRMA
points out that “virtually all manufacturers’ sales of prescription drugs
occur outside of Maine in transactions with wholesalers and
distributors.”65 Given this fact, PhRMA insists that requiring them to
give rebates would be tantamount to regulation of commercial
transactions out-of-state.66 PhRMA argues, since most of the commercial
transactions that will be affected by Maine Rx take place out-of-state and
will benefit only Maine residents, the program essentially discriminates
against interstate commerce in order to exclusively fund in-state
participants.67
2. Procedural posture
The district court agreed with PhRMA on both68 of its arguments,
adopting its reasoning virtually wholesale. The Court granted an
injunction enjoining Maine from “penalizing manufacturers, by placing
59. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
60. See Walsh, 538 U.S. at 662.
61. See id.
62. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See also Am. Trucking Ass’n. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n,
125 S.Ct. 2419, 2422 (2005) (succinctly reviewing the dormant Commerce Clause and supporting
case law).
63. Brief of Petitioner at 26–38, Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644
(2003) (No. 01-188).
64. See supra text accompanying notes 39–41.
65. Brief of Petitioner at 29, Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 (2003)
(No. 01-188) (internal citations omitted).
66. See id.
67. See id. at 35.
68. The district court also agreed with PhRMA on its arguments against Maine Rx’s antiprofiteering provisions, which the state later dropped when it appealed the Court’s decision, and will
not be discussed further in this Note. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Comm’r, No. Civ. 00-157B-H, 2000 WL 34290605, at *2–*3 (D. Me. Oct. 26, 2000).
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their drugs on [the prior approval plan], for refusing to negotiate or to
pay a rebate to Maine’s Rx program.”69 On appeal, the First Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the district court and vacated the injunction.70
B. The Decision of the United States Supreme Court71
1. The plurality
Justices Stevens, writing for the Court, is joined by Justices Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer. These four form the core of the plurality, which
begins by stating that it is not required to rule on the validity of Maine
Rx, pointing out that the district court had conducted neither evidentiary
hearings, nor formally resolved any factual disputes.72 In so doing, the
plurality attempts to confine its decision to the injunction, and leave the
rest to later proceedings.73
In addressing PhRMA’s preemption argument, the plurality states
that the question presented is, presuming that the state statute is valid,
“whether there is a probability that Maine’s program was preempted by
the mere existence of the federal [Medicaid] statute.”74 The plurality
rejects PhRMA’s contention that, because Maine had not put forth any
Medicaid-related purpose to justify Maine Rx’s prior approval provisions
before the district court, it had waived the existence of any such
purposes.75 Rather, the plurality holds that a waiver theory is
inappropriate in this case because Maine had never represented that there
were no Medicaid-related purposes. Given the presumption of validity to
which the plurality suggests the statute is entitled, and by virtue of
PhRMA’s position as the party seeking the injunction, the burden is upon
PhRMA to “establish[] by a clear showing, a probability of success on
69. Id. at *7.
70. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 97 (1st Cir. 2001).
However, the Circuit Court also recognized that some Medicaid beneficiaries might encounter some
actionable harm as a result of Maine Rx’s prior approval requirements, and thus reserved the right of
such an aggrieved party to petition for a limited injunction at that point to readdress the matter in that
context. See id. at 97–98. The Circuit Court’s reasoning was extensively addressed (and largely
accepted) by the Supreme Court on certiorari, and is noted, where relevant, in sub-section B infra.
71. The Walsh decision is highly fractured. In addition to the plurality’s opinion, the Court
offers three concurring and one dissenting opinion. The concurring opinions, offered by Justices
Breyer, Scalia and Thomas, focus largely on substantive differences with the plurality’s treatment of
PhRMA’s preemption argument. Because this Note is concerned with procedural aspects of the
plurality’s opinion, which are not treated by these concurrences, I will not discuss them further. See
Walsh, 538 U.S. at 670–83.
72. Id. at 660.
73. See id. at 660, 668.
74. Id. at 661
75. See id. at 662–63.

549]

GETTING IT RIGHT BY GETTING IT WRONG

559

the merits.”76 Thus, if an injunction was to be granted, it is PhRMA’s
duty to show the absence or impossibility of any Medicaid-related
purposes, and not the other way around.77 From these premises, the
plurality reasons that “if [Maine Rx] on its face clearly serves some
Medicaid-related goals, it would follow that the district court’s
evaluation rested on an erroneous predicate,” and thus, should be
reversed.78 The plurality then proceeds to name three such facially
apparent Medicaid-related purposes.
First, the plurality agrees with the First Circuit Court that Maine Rx
will extend benefits to individuals who can be classified within the
Medicaid statute as “medically needy,” even if they may not be
“categorically needy.”79 Justice Stevens reasons that the Medicaid statute
explicitly authorizes States to extend benefits to this group of people.80
He further notes that although PhRMA points to possible overinclusiveness81 as a sure sign that Maine Rx does not have a Medicaid
purpose, “the potential benefits for nonneedy persons would not nullify
the benefits that would be provided to the neediest segment of the
uninsured population.”82 Second, the plurality also agrees with the First
Circuit Court that Maine Rx might reduce Medicaid spending by aiding
people in addressing illnesses earlier, so that they are not forced to enroll
in Medicaid later when their illnesses are advanced, and are then much
more costly to treat.83 Third, the plurality, sua sponte, presents a possible
Medicaid-related purpose. The plurality argues that by simply using a
prior approval plan for dispensing drug benefits to Medicaid patients,
regardless of the State’s motivations therefore, the State will probably
save money.84 Such savings have been demonstrated by earlier prior
approval plans conducted by managed care organizations.85 The plurality
suggests that controlling costs is a “rather obvious” Medicaid-related
goal.86
By way of qualification, the plurality admits that although Maine Rx
may serve Medicaid-related purposes, such possibilities would not allow
support of the program against an application for injunction if it
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 662.
See id.
Id. at 662–63.
Id. at 663.
Id. at 651.
See supra text accompanying note 37.
Walsh, 538 U.S. at 663.
See id.
Id. at 663–64.
See id.
Id. at 663.
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“severely curtailed Medicaid recipients’ access to prescription drugs.”87
However, the district court’s reliance on the premise that “any
impediment ‘[n]o matter how modest,’ to a patient’s ability to obtain the
drug of her choice at state expense would invalidate [Maine Rx]” was
misplaced, because minimal incursions on Medicaid beneficiaries’
benefits do not outweigh the State’s power of broad discretion in
administering its own Medicaid plan.88 Nor do they outweigh “Maine’s
interest in protecting the health of its uninsured residents.”89 As long as
Maine assures “meaningful access” to its Medicaid beneficiaries, it does
not truly matter what its motivations are for using its otherwise “broad
discretion to define the package of benefits it will finance.”90
Finally, the plurality holds that “the impact on manufacturers that
Maine Rx is sure to have is not relevant because any transfer of business
to less expensive products will produce savings for the Medicaid
program.”91
With regard to PhRMA’s dormant Commerce Clause arguments, the
plurality, this time joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Breyer, agrees with the First Circuit once more,
holding that Maine Rx neither regulates prices of out-of-state sales
transactions,92 nor does it tie the price of in-state products to out-of-state
prices.93 Maine Rx does not impose special burdens on certain
manufacturers, while favoring others, nor do the rebates that Maine Rx
grants provide “special benefit to competitors of rebate-paying
manufacturers.”94 Thus, Maine Rx does not violate the dormant
Commerce Clause.
2. The dissent95
Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Kennedy, form the dissent in Walsh. The dissent does not so much
87. Id. at 664.
88. Id. at 665.
89. Id. at 666.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 668.
92. Here, the plurality observes that Maine is not insisting that drug-makers sell their
products to specific retailers or wholesalers for a certain price, but merely elicit a rebate from all
manufacturers alike. Id. at 669.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 670.
95. The “dissent” in Walsh also concurred with the plurality’s reasoning concerning
PhRMA’s dormant Commerce Clause argument. It is because of this concurrence that I do not
address their response to the dormant Commerce Clause argument again here. See supra text
accompanying notes 92–94.
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disagree with the plurality’s reasoning regarding PhRMA’s preemption
claims, as it objects to the plurality’s conclusions and the means used to
reach them. The dissent argues that the district court’s decision to grant
the injunction was not an abuse of discretion, because Maine Rx does not
demonstrate any prima facie Medicaid-related purposes, the intention
behind its creation being wholly unrelated to Medicaid goals.96
The dissent adopts the “preemption test” articulated in Glade v.
National Solid Wastes Management Association.97 The dissent, following
Glade’s lead, argues that the correct standard is to review the structure
and purpose of each program in order to assess whether the intent of
Maine’s legislature in the passage of Maine Rx aligns sufficiently with
Congress’ intent in the passage of the Medicaid Act.98 The dissent seems
to suggest that under Glade, the key focus should be on the driving
motives behind the programs’ passage.99 If Maine, in enacting Maine Rx,
is pursuing the same ends that Congress pursued in the passage of the
Medicaid Act, then the two programs are in conflict, and the Supremacy
Clause mandates that the federal statute preempt that of the State.100
Thus, the dissent concludes that “[a] State . . . may impose prior
authorization to reduce Medicaid costs[,]” but may not “impose prior
authorization to generate revenue for purposes wholly unrelated to its
Medicaid program.”101 The dissent also argues that although there is no
explicit prohibition on the use of prior authorization plans in the statutory
language, the “purpose and structure” of the Medicaid Act inherently
limits the usage of that mechanism for other-than-Medicaid-related
ends.102
As the dissent notes in Walsh, Maine Rx specifically states that its
purpose is “to reduce prescription drug prices for residents of the State,
and it accomplishes this goal by threatening to impose prior authorization
on otherwise covered outpatient drugs.”103 The dissent assumes that
Maine Rx operates regardless of financial need, and therefore the
program’s stated purpose reveals a motive incongruent with that of the
Medicaid Act, which seeks to provide healthcare access to the poor.104
Given that statutory language constituting Maine Rx does not evidence a
96. Walsh, 538 U.S. at 684 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
97. Glade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992).
98. Walsh, 538 U.S. at 684–85 (O’Connor, J. dissenting).
99. Id. at 685.
100. Id. at 684–85.
101. Id. at 685.
102. Id. at 685–86.
103. Id. at 687 (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2681(1), (2)(F), (7) (West Supp. 2002))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
104. See Walsh, 538 U.S. at 687 (O’Connor, J. dissenting).
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Medicaid-related purpose on its face, and that Maine did not advance any
such purpose in the court below, and that there are no facts in the record
supporting such purposes, the dissent concludes that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in granting an injunction against Maine Rx.105
The dissent notably points out that in evaluating the granting of an
injunction on appeal, the Court is not to assume that the district court is
required to do factual contortions to find Medicaid-related purposes
when no party advanced such arguments below.106
IV. ANALYSIS
Having thus explored the background behind Walsh and the
reasoning behind the plurality’s and dissent’s arguments, I now turn to an
examination of these opinions and their effect on the pressing need for
healthcare reform. I will hereafter attempt to show that the plurality’s
assessment of the standard of review is incorrect, and as such, PhRMA
should technically have prevailed in this case. However, I suggest that
from a practical standpoint, the plurality’s procedural mistake resulted in
the best possible overall outcome, given pressing concerns about
healthcare reform.
Nevertheless, despite the Court’s procedural flaws, the decision is
still defensible. At its core, Walsh presents an ethically charged issue.
Subtle legal packaging aside, the case ultimately asks the Court to
balance human lives against corporate profits. Given this rather perverse
calculus, I submit that equity requires the result the plurality reaches,
even in the face of technical mandates to the contrary. Additionally, the
plurality’s decision has great potential for encouraging state-sponsored
healthcare reform, in that it affirms the right of the States to use their
police powers to provide for their uninsured residents, even when the use
of those powers implicates federal programs.
A. The Plurality Stumbles on the Standard of Review
1. The plurality’s shaky foundation
As beneficial as the plurality’s position may be, because it is based
upon an improper application of the standard of review, it is procedurally
flawed at its foundation. While initially presenting the correct standard of
review,107 the plurality thereafter seems to ignore that standard by
105. See id. at 689.
106. See id.
107. See infra text accompanying notes 108–18.
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presuming the validity of Maine Rx on appeal. Despite the district
court’s prior judicial determination that the statute was invalid, the
plurality incorrectly holds that the district court’s grant of an injunction
was erroneous because it did not raise Maine’s arguments sua sponte.
a. The statement of the standard. Citing Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc.,108
the plurality correctly recognizes that the standard of review here is
whether the district court abused its discretion in awarding PhRMA an
injunction.109 Doran sets forth the familiar and demanding standard for
granting a preliminary injunction, which requires a plaintiff to establish
both irreparable injury, should the injunction not be issued, and
likelihood of prevailing on the merits.110 Doran also states the standard
of review for injunctions on appeal, specifically noting that “while the
standard to be applied by the district
plaintiff is entitled to a preliminary
standard of appellate review is simply
injunction . . . constituted an abuse of

court in deciding whether a
injunction is stringent, the
whether the issuance of the
111
discretion.” Since the Court

is reviewing the award of an injunction in this case, the correct standard
of review, as provided by Doran, is whether the district court abused its
discretion in granting the injunction.112
It is well-established that acts of judicial discretion, such as the
injunction at issue in Walsh, are given extreme deference upon review.113
The abuse of discretion standard is incredibly accommodating towards
the trial judge’s decision. By way of example, it is said that “a mere error
of judgment is not abuse of discretion.”114 Much more than this, in the
context of appellate review, abuse of discretion is often characterized as
resulting “manifest injustice,” or decision-making that “is the result of
partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will[,]” or decisions that are “arbitrary or
capricious,” “against logic and the facts and reasonable deductions to be
drawn therefrom,” or so erroneous “as to shock reason and justice.”115
Furthermore, a reviewing court may not overturn a grant of injunction
merely because it would have decided the case differently.116 Indeed, “[a]
reviewing court is never justified in substituting its discretion for that of
the trial court.”117 Positively stated, a reviewing court must affirm a trial
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
Walsh, 538 U.S. at 660.
Doran, 422 U.S. at 931.
Id. at 931–32.
Id.
See 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 772 (1993).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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judge’s grant of injunction if it “believes that a judicial mind could
reasonably have reached the conclusion of the court below, or whether
any reasonable person would agree with the trial court.”118 Obviously,
this standard is very difficult to meet. Yet, as will be shown hereafter, the
plurality all but ignores the high bar set here by Doran in finding the
district court’s holding an abuse of discretion.
b. Presumptions of constitutionality on appeal. A central element of
the plurality’s justification of the standard of review in Walsh is its
determination that the Maine Rx statute is entitled to a presumption of
validity on appeal.119 The plurality relies upon Davies Warehouse Co. v.
Bowles120 in establishing that the Maine Rx statute is entitled to a
presumption of validity.121 Davies stands, in relevant part, for the
proposition that, in the context of a court reviewing potential preemption
of state statutes on the merits, “[s]tate statutes . . . are entitled to the
presumption of constitutionality until their invalidity is judicially
declared.”122
The plurality argues that since the Secretary of Health had not
otherwise held the Maine Rx statute to be in conflict with the Medicaid
Act, the statute is therefore entitled to a presumption of constitutional
validity, even, so it seems, on appeal concerning merely an award of
injunction.123 However, it is highly questionable whether the
presumption-of-validity principle in Davies is applicable to the current
case. In Davies, the Court reviewed the preemption of state-legislated
railroad regulation statutes by similar federal provisions. 124 It did so on
the merits, and only after the specialty forums assigned to handle appeals
specifically on those statutes had already passed their judgment on the
same issue.125 In Walsh, the Court is only reviewing a grant of an
injunction, and not the substantial validity of Maine Rx itself.
Furthermore, the Department of Health and Human Services (the
specialty forum assigned to review the States’ Medicaid plans) has not
yet passed upon the validity of Maine Rx. 126 This is in stark contrast to
the situation in Davies, where the merits of the preemption question had

118. Id.
119. Walsh, 538 U.S. at 661–62.
120. Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144 (1944).
121. Walsh, 538 U.S. at 661.
122. Davies, 321 U.S. at 153 (emphasis added).
123. Walsh, 538 U.S. at 661–62.
124. Davies, 321 U.S. at 147.
125. The merits of federal preemption of the state railroad regulation statutes were passed
upon by both the federal Price Administrator and the then-extant U.S. Emergency Court of Appeals
before the Supreme Court addressed the issue again on the merits. Id.
126. Walsh, 538 U.S. at 660.
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already been passed upon by both of the forums assigned to hear
challenges to railroad regulations.127 There is no suggestion in the Davies
case that the presumption of validity is applicable when the merits of the
statute to be accorded the presumption are not even at issue.128 Even if
the Davies constitutional-presumption principle was applicable to
interlocutory determinations at the trial level, at the appellate level,
where a district court has already “judicially declared” the invalidity of
the statute in question, that statute should be entitled to no such
presumption.129
In accepting Doran’s casting of the standard of review, the plurality
should have presumed the validity of the district court’s holding
concerning the invalidity of the Maine Rx statute. On appeal, the correct
presumption applicable when reviewing injunctions should be in favor of
the district court’s determination, in keeping with the abuse of discretion
standard. However, the plurality sharply diverges from this established
standard by presuming the validity of the Maine Rx statute. If the
presumption had been correctly made in PhRMA’s favor, Maine could
never have carried its burden on appeal of proving abuse of discretion,
since the record was insufficient to support Medicaid-related purposes to
overcome PhRMA’s preemption argument. In this manner, the plurality
mistakenly held in favor of Maine.
c. The dissent and the arguments not made. In addition to the
mistaken presumption of constitutional validity, the plurality’s decision
is also based upon the very tenuous, and ultimately incorrect, conclusion
that PhRMA failed to meet its burden by not making Maine’s arguments
for it.130 The plurality finds that the district court’s grant of an injunction
127. See supra text accompanying note 125.
128. Some may argue that when an appellate court reviews a grant of injunction, the
underlying merits of the case in which the injunction is granted are brought into issue before the
reviewing court as well. Such a contention is only partially accurate. In the context of an appellate
review of a trial court’s grant of injunction, the abuse of discretion standard permits an inquiry into
the underlying merits of the case only to the extent that such a review reveals that the trial judge did
or did not abuse his discretion in finding that the moving party met its burden. See 36 C.J.S. Federal
Courts § 598 (1993). Thus, the merits of the underlying case are only at issue at the appellate level
insomuch as the appellate court may examine them to determine whether, based upon the record
developed before the trial court, a reasonable judge could find that the moving party met its burden.
See 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error §§ 716, 772 (1993); 36 C.J.S. Federal Courts § 598. In addition, the
highly deferential abuse of discretion standard suggests that a reviewing court should not interfere
with a trial court’s equitable discretion merely because they may disagree with the outcome. See
supra text accompanying notes 116–17. In summary, it is the trial judge’s evaluation of the moving
party’s efforts to show that it has a likelihood of prevailing on the merits that is at issue on appeal,
and not the merits themselves. Given this severely limited sense in which a reviewing court may
properly address the underlying merits on appeal of a grant of injunction, I submit that the merits of
the case are not truly at issue at all.
129. See supra text accompanying note 122.
130. See Walsh, 538 U.S. at 662–63.
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was an abuse of discretion because PhRMA did not carry its burden at
the trial court level by establishing that there were no possible Medicaidrelated purposes apparent from Maine Rx on its face. 131 As the dissent
rightly points out, this was likewise a misapplication of the abuse of
discretion standard because the argument effectively shifts the burden to
PhRMA and the district court to formulate, raise, and consider all of
Maine’s arguments on its behalf.132 Such an interpretation of the
responsibilities of lower courts when considering motions for injunction
is unreasonable, in that it requires judges to be partisan. In addition, its
application on appeal does great violence to the deference normally
accorded to their acts of judicial discretion when under appellate review.
I argue that it also sets the burden on parties moving for injunctions
unreasonably high and undermines the principal notions underpinning
our adversarial system of justice.
On appeal, PhRMA argues that since Maine did not raise any
Medicaid-related purposes for Maine Rx in the district court, they were
barred from doing so on appeal.133 The plurality maintains, however, that
Maine’s failure to present Medicaid-related purposes for Maine Rx to the
district court did not constitute a waiver of their ability to raise such
considerations on appeal.134 According to its reasoning, since at the trial
level PhRMA bore the heavy burden of “establishing, by a clear
showing, a probability of success on the merits”, waiver theories were
inapplicable to Maine’s appeal.135 The “State never represented that there
was no Medicaid purpose served by its program; it simply argued that it
did not need to offer one.”136 The plurality argues that since it could
conceive of three possible Medicaid-related purposes (which were not
presented to the district court), the grant of injunction “rested on an
erroneous predicate.”137 This characterization of both PhRMA’s and the
district court’s burden on appeal is entirely against the standard of
review, not to mention an unreasonable distortion of the test for an
injunction.138
131. See id.
132. See id. at 687–90.
133. See id. at 662–663.
134. See id.
135. Id. at 662.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 663.
138. I allude to the plurality’s harsh interpretation of the test for an injunction. The Walsh
plurality purports to adopt the injunction test from Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997)
(per curiam). Walsh, 538 U.S. at 662. The Mazurek decision requires that the party moving for an
injunction demonstrate, by a clear showing, that it is able to carry the burden of persuasion.
Mazurek, 520 U.S. at 972. Although the requirement is undeniably high, ability to carry the burden
of persuasion does not include the responsibility of proving inevitability of success, which seems to
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The dissent offers some effective counters to the plurality’s
arguments. The dissent notes first that the Maine Rx statute did not
reveal any Medicaid-related purpose on its face.139 Far from it, Maine
Rx’s explicitly stated goal is “to reduce prescription drug prices for
residents of the State,” at the expense of benefits that would otherwise
have been available to Medicaid beneficiaries without the statute’s
interference.140 The dissent then argues that since Maine did not raise any
other Medicaid-related purposes in the district court, it left the record
void of any such arguments to evaluate on appeal for abuse of
discretion.141 Therefore, the Medicaid-related purposes that the plurality
suggests as possible candidates “rests on factual predicates that are not
supported in the record.”142 Additionally, the dissent argues that each of
the three Medicaid purposes the plurality advances are at best
speculative, and as such it could not have been properly expected of the
district court to develop and make such guesses of its own accord,
especially when Maine had failed to do so itself.143 Expecting the district
court to conceive of these arguments sua sponte is not in keeping with
the abuse of discretion standard that the plurality purports to apply in this
case. In fact, the dissent’s position serves to highlight just how badly the
plurality’s arguments gore the deference usually due a district court when
ruling on a discretionary act. As stated previously, the abuse of discretion
standard should give substantial deference to the trial judge’s opinion.144
In this case, the plurality overturns the district court’s holding not
because it was biased or because it failed to consider relevant facts in the
record, but because it did not create that record itself. Inasmuch as trial
courts’ discretionary acts are usually afforded very wide latitude, the
plurality’s opinion in this case tramples on an important assurance that
the trial courts need to achieve just and equitable resolutions of difficult
and complicated problems.
be what the plurality requires. See Walsh, 538 U.S. at 662–63. In other words, PhRMA’s proper
burden before the district court was demonstrating that, based upon the record before the Court, it
will not lose. The district court believed that PhRMA did so. It is uncontested that PhRMA
addressed and met every argument that Maine presented at the trial court proceedings, and that the
district court was satisfied they could prevail on the merits based upon those proceedings. See
Walsh, 538 U.S. at 658–59, 687–88. The Walsh plurality, however, would also require that PhRMA
demonstrate success even beyond the record, requiring instead that PhRMA also counter arguments
that its opponent never made. See id. Mazurek does not require such Herculean efforts. Mazurek, 520
U.S. at 972.
139. Walsh, 538 U.S. at 688.
140. See id. at 687 (quoting ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 §§ 2681(1), (2)(F), (7) (West Supp.
2002)).
141. See id. at 688.
142. Id.
143. See id. at 688–89.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 113–18.
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Furthermore, the plurality’s insistence that PhRMA anticipate and
counter every possible contingency within Maine Rx that could serve as
a Medicaid-related purpose, regardless of whether Maine argued such or
not, simply because PhRMA “bore the burden of establishing . . . a
probability of success on the merits[,]”145 places an unreasonably high
burden on it, even given the already-stringent burden plaintiffs normally
bear when seeking an injunction.146 The plurality is mistaken in requiring
such an exacting showing from PhRMA. Even given the plurality’s test
that PhRMA’s burden before the district court was to establish by a clear
showing that it had a probability of success on the merits,147 this is still a
different standard than requiring PhRMA to explore and counter every
conceivable argument that Maine could make, which is truly what the
plurality appears to expect.148 Such a standard is unobtainable in most
instances, because there are usually innumerable possible arguments that
any party can make on any given issue. Many of these possible
arguments may have little or no merit, because they might consider
extremely remote factual possibilities. In proceedings on the merits of
the issue, such remote possibilities would most likely be considered
frivolous, and the plaintiff would not need to counter them to actually
succeed on the merits, let alone demonstrate a probability of success
against such arguments. Thus, it is a mistake for the plurality to interpret
PhRMA’s burden as requiring such an impossible and exacting showing
at the district court level.
Finally, the plurality’s expectation that either PhRMA or the district
court anticipate and consider all of Maine’s arguments for it, even those
that the State did not make, and for which there is no support from facts
in the record, is mistaken because it undermines our adversarial system
of justice. In Perry v. Leeke, Justice Marshall observed that “[t]he
paramount importance of vigorous representation follows from the nature
of our adversarial system of justice. This system is premised on the welltested principle that truth—as well as fairness—is best discovered by
powerful statements on both sides of the question.”149 Our entire legal
system is predicated upon the supposition that when two parties advocate
their positions fervently before a neutral arbiter, the truth can be more
clearly seen. Requiring one party to make the arguments for the other, or
requiring such of the neutral arbiter, turns this system on its head, and

145. Walsh, 538 U.S. at 662.
146. See supra text accompanying note 138.
147. See id.
148. See Walsh, 538 U.S. at 662.
149. Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 291 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
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only lends confusion and inequality to an otherwise well-established
process. Moreover, such requirements give the nonmoving party the
perverse incentive to tread more frequently on the rights of the moving
party. This is because under this system the nonmovant has virtually no
responsibility to mount a defense, while the movant must himself
shoulder the impossible burden of developing and addressing all of the
defendant’s arguments, or face a refusal of remedy. This absurd result
could not possibly have been the plurality’s intention, but its
interpretation of the standard of review in Walsh suggests exactly this
consequence. Therefore, the plurality’s interpretation of the standard is
wrong.
2. No other justification for the plurality’s standard
Given the arguments above, I explore now whether the plurality
could have more effectively ignored the standard of review altogether to
achieve a sounder result. One possible approach, which I will explore
below, has been used to completely overcome the standard of review.
However, this device is strictly limited to certain circumstances that
necessarily call for exception, and the facts at issue in Walsh do not
justify deviance from the normal standard.
In Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, the Court held that the issues of the case were ripe for
decision, even though it was still in the process of interlocutory appeal.150
In bypassing the usual standard of review to reach the merits of the case,
the Court made the unusual observation that “a court of appeals
ordinarily will limit its review in a case of this kind to abuse of discretion
is a rule of orderly judicial administration, not a limit on judicial
power.”151 However, the Court also strictly limited such an interpretation
of the standard to cases where there is “an unusually complete factual
record and legal presentation from which to address the important []
issues at stake.”152 Thus, where the record is still underdeveloped, as in
Walsh, this exception does not apply.153
Thornburgh illustrates the extreme circumstances that are required
for a court to ignore the abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a
trial court’s award of an injunction. It was not enough for the plurality in
Walsh to disagree with the district court’s decision to award PhRMA an
150. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 755–57 (1986)
(overruled on other grounds by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)).
151. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 757.
152. Id.
153. See id. at 757 n.8.
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injunction to overturn that decision. Indeed, it has been noted that “[t]he
fact that the appellate court would have decided otherwise does not
establish an abuse of discretion.”154 Rather, to overcome the extremely
deferential abuse of discretion standard, an extremely well-developed
record and strictly circumscribed legal issues are required. As neither of
these elements are present in Walsh,155 the plurality has no existing
justification for treating the abuse of discretion standard as a lower
plenary review standard.
In light of the arguments made above, it is difficult to see how the
plurality reached the holding that it did. Indeed, I submit that the only
conclusion to be drawn from this discussion is that because the plurality
is mistaken in the way it addresses the abuse of discretion standard, it
should not have overturned the district court’s grant of injunction, but
should have held in PhRMA’s favor.
B. Getting it Right by Getting it Wrong
Rather ironically, although the plurality, procedurally speaking, was
incorrect in overturning the injunction against Maine Rx, and should
have found in favor of PhRMA, this does not mean that its decision is
wrong. Ultimately, the Court must balance the core interests clashing in
Walsh, human lives and corporate profits. Faced with such a decision,
equity and sound policy require a result in Maine’s favor. Furthermore,
the plurality’s decision to hold in Maine’s favor opens a valuable door in
the pressing area of healthcare reform. The aid that this decision will
give to States as they work towards much-needed healthcare reforms has
been, and will likely continue to be, invaluable in achieving greater
access to healthcare services. For these two reasons, the plurality, in
holding against the standard of review, arguably achieves a more just
result than if it had correctly applied the standard.
1. Doing justice and equity
a. Healthcare and the problem of access. One of the most urgent
problems facing healthcare in America is the problem of access. In 2004,
45.8 million Americans went without any health insurance for all or part
of the year.156 This number represents a trend in growth, especially
among those who work part-time, where the number of uninsured rose by
154. 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 772.
155. See Walsh, 538 U.S. at 660.
156. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH
INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE U.S.: 2004, 16 (2005).
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almost 3% in one year, and also amongst those households that had an
annual income of between $50,000 and $75,000, where the number of
uninsured rose by almost 10,000 in one year.157 Worse than this, some 70
million Americans had no insurance for prescription drugs in 2004.158
This number may be ameliorated in the future somewhat by the provision
of the new Medicare drug benefit, albeit perhaps not as extensively as
some previously believed it would.159 In the end, however, these numbers
reflect the reality that there is a sizable population that does not have any
aid available to it to offset out-of-pocket expenditures on healthcare,
especially on prescription drugs.
One recent study noted that “[e]xpenditures for prescription drugs in
the United States are increasing much faster than total health
spending.”160 Indeed, the Kaiser Family Foundation reported that in
2002, spending on prescription drugs totaled $162.4 billion, an increase
of 15% from the previous year, reflecting a trend that has held
substantially constant for eight years.161 Additionally, the prices of
prescription drugs have continued to steadily climb at an average rate of
7.4% for the last decade, more than double the average inflation rate of
2.5%.162 This means that drug prices are continuing to increase at a
dramatic rate, while prescription drug coverage continues to shrink. The
logical result is that many of this population have to forego utilization of
prescription drugs. One 2003 survey found that “37% of the uninsured
said they did not fill a prescription because of cost, compared to 13% of
the insured.”163
It is now well-accepted that many medical conditions are easily
treatable with access to the right medicines, and yet a growing number of
people must do without, because they cannot afford the medicines they
need, to the endangerment of their health and, in certain cases, their lives.
b. The pharmaceutical industry. In contrast, the pharmaceutical
industry is, in all respects, very healthy. In 2004, the top twenty drug
manufacturers made approximately $332.5 billion in sales.164 According
157. Id. at 18.
158. FURROW ET AL., supra note 5, at 805.
159. See Bruce Stuart, et al., Assessing The Impact of Coverage Gaps in the Medicare Part D
Drug Benefit, HEALTH AFF., (2005) available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint
/hlthaff.w5.167v1.**
160. AMERICAN PUBLIC HEALTH ASSOCIATION, Making Medicines Affordable: the Price
Factor (2000) at *2, APHA Position Paper 20006, May 13, 2004, at *2, available at
http://www.apha.org/legislative/testimonies/FDAimportComments5_13.pdf.
161. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, Prescription Drug Trends, October 2004,
at *1, http://www.kff.org/rxdrugs/upload/Prescription-Drug-Trends-October-2004-UPDATE.pdf.
162. Id.
163. Id. at *2.
164. M. Asif Ismail, Special Report: Drug Lobby Second to None, How the Pharmaceutical
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to recent raw data, the pharmaceutical industry, as a whole, garnered
$20.3 billion dollars in net profits in 2004, outstripping every other
American industry by at least $5 billion.165 The same data revealed that
these earnings represent a profit-to-revenue ratio of 18.9%, the largest
profit ratio of any industry in America, at almost 7% more than the next
highest industry.166 Of its total expenditures for 2004, the pharmaceutical
industry spent nearly $60 billion on marketing for its products, as
opposed to the approximately $30 billion it spent on research and
development, undercutting the industry’s arguments that programs like
Maine Rx will do long-term harm to society because they will reduce
available funds for research and development of new drugs.167 These data
demonstrate that pharmaceutical manufacturers, unlike the uninsured
American public, are in excellent shape.
c. The balancing of equities. Procedural considerations aside,
Maine’s most powerful argument lies in equitable principles. Maine
deserves a ruling in its favor not because it has the sounder legal
argument, but because the stakes involved weigh heavier on the State’s
side. PhRMA’s most pressing interest in opposing Maine Rx was its
bottom line. By allowing Maine residents to purchase prescription drugs
at reduced prices, which are funded by the rebates that the State
leverages from the pharmaceutical manufacturers, Maine Rx requires
those manufacturers to fund the drug benefit. The rebates that the
manufacturers would have to pay the State would effectively reduce the
amount of profits manufacturers could make otherwise. The drug
companies stand to lose a significant amount of money in lost profits,
due to the reduced profit margin imposed by the rebate program. At stake
for Maine, however, is the ability to increase access to prescription drugs
for its residents, and thereby improve, or even save, lives of residents. By
offering reduced prices on needed drugs for those who are too poor to
afford better health insurance, but who have too much to qualify for
Medicaid assistance, Maine Rx offers a reasonable way to improve
access. In the end, Walsh pitted human life against pharmaceutical
manufacturers’ profit. Given this calculus, it seems only natural that

Industry Gets its Way in Washington, Center for Public Integrity (July 7, 2005), available at
http://www.publicintegrity.org/rx/report.aspx?aid=723.
165. Bernard Sanders, New Figures Prove Pharmaceutical Industry Continues to Fleece
Americans, (Oct. 30, 2005). http://bernie.house.gov/prescriptions/profits.asp
166. Id.
167. Ismail, supra note 164. See also, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, Impact of
Direct-to-Consumer Advertising on Prescription Drug Spending, Jun. 2003, at 7, available at
http://www.kff.org/rxdrugs/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=14378
(detailing how industry spending on certain forms of advertising is not essential to continued
increases in drug spending).
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Maine, with the more deserving equities hanging in the balance, should
have prevailed, no matter what the procedural defects its case
encountered. It is in light of these weightier considerations that the
plurality’s decision, although mistaken in application of the standard of
review, nevertheless seems to be more in line with a sense of justice and
equity, as well as better public policy.
2. What was gained and what was lost
a. Reforming healthcare. By deciding against the injunction against
Maine Rx, the plurality afforded States greater ease and power in
accomplishing healthcare reform. Given the number of Americans who
believe that healthcare reform is a vital goal,168 the plurality’s decision is
arguably justified by a compelling public policy to encourage effective
reform. The plurality’s decision encourages reform by sustaining the
States’ use of police powers to provide for their uninsured residents.
While it is true that the plurality attempted to limit the impact of its
ruling specifically to injunction cases where the state healthcare action in
question has not yet been reviewed by the Secretary of Health,169 I
believe that the inevitable result has been, and will continue to be, much
more expansive in effect. For example, the plurality’s ruling with regard
to PhRMA’s dormant Commerce Clause argument170 found much greater
support, with only Justices Scalia and Thomas abstaining therefrom.171
This showing of solidarity will most likely preclude future challenges to
States’ healthcare reform efforts (ala Maine Rx), through use of the
dormant Commerce Clause.172 In addition, the plurality’s arguments
dealing with the issue of federal preemption provide reform-minded
lower courts with some ammunition for upholding State healthcare
reform efforts against challenges by drug companies seeking to protect
their wide profit margins. For courts that are less “activist,” the Walsh

168. See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, March/April2005 Health Poll Report
Survey, Apr. 2005, at 4, available at http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/March-April-2005Kaiser-Health-Poll-Report-Toplines.pdf.
169. See Walsh, 538 U.S. at 660–61.
170. I have deliberately chosen not to widely discuss this already-well-explored area of the
Walsh opinion, but the effect that this aspect of the opinion has, and will continue to have, on
healthcare reform is too important to remain completely untouched. Thus, I recognize it here as
perhaps the single greatest contribution of the opinion to state healthcare reform efforts.
171. Walsh, 538 U.S. at 683.
172. See e.g., Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America v. Walsh: The Supreme Court Allows States to Proceed with Expanding Access to Drugs, 4
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 69, 83 (2004); Jessica S. Intermill, Note, Take Two and Call
Your Legislator in the Morning: What States Can Learn From Pharmaceutical Manufacturers of
America v. Walsh, 27 HAMLINE L. REV. 265, 293–95 (2004).
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opinions, particularly the two concurrences, give some power to lower
courts to aid state healthcare reform programs like Maine Rx by
encouraging them to defer to the Secretary of Health whenever
possible.173 Perhaps most importantly, the plurality’s opinion aides State
healthcare reform by sustaining the States’ use of their police powers to
“protect[] the health of its uninsured residents” in the face of commercial
challenges, even when the exercise of such powers overflows into areas
governed by federal statutes.174
b. Dilution of potency through procedural flaws and fracture.
Inasmuch as the plurality’s opinion is a boon to States’ efforts at
healthcare reform, its impact may still be muted somewhat for two
reasons. First, the procedural flaws with the plurality’s opinion take away
from the force of its arguments by weakening its credibility. The dissent
points out the most glaring problems with the plurality’s application of
the abuse of discretion standard,175 and I have supplemented and
expanded those arguments to illustrate the validity of the dissent’s
position in this regard. The procedural flaws of the plurality’s position
may weaken the impact that the decision could have. Nevertheless, in a
choice between aiding state healthcare reform and protecting drug
company profits, I believe that the plurality’s decision ended up the wiser
part, even if that decision costs some precedential weight through lack of
credible procedural foundation. After all, such observations do not
change the fact that the plurality’s opinion remains, for all intents and
purposes, the preeminent opinion of the case, which lower courts are
bound to follow.
Second, Walsh’s impact on healthcare reform may also lose potency
simply because the Court was so fractured in its decision. A greater
showing of solidarity could have done more to support the cause of stateinitiated healthcare reform by giving challenging parties less incentive to
bring suits that they know will most likely fail on appeal, given the
definiteness of the Court’s position on the matter. Walsh’s efficacy may
be diminished because challengers will see a weak and divided Supreme
Court that may turn its way on the very next case.
C. Looking Toward a Brighter Future—Hope for Continued Reform
1. Minor changes and subsequent litigation
Immediately after the Court’s decision in Walsh, the legislature of
173. Walsh, 538 U.S. at 660–61, 670–84.
174. Id. at 666.
175. See Id. at 684–90.
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Maine, to avoid future litigation and the need to submit the program for
approval by the Secretary of Health, altered Maine Rx somewhat to
address some of the contentions PhRMA raised during the prior
litigation.176 A minor change that the Maine legislature made was the
removal of the anti-racketeering provisions in the original Maine Rx
statute, which the district court held unconstitutional in the prior
litigation, and which the Maine legislature never appealed. The Maine
legislature also changed eligibility provisions in the program, this time
explicitly linking eligibility for enrollment with financial
considerations.177 To signify the new status of the program, the Maine
legislature also renamed the program “Maine Rx Plus.”178 Commenting
on the changes, Maine’s Attorney General speculates that the new
“program meets all the standards and guidelines of (Central Medical
services, the agency that oversees the federal Medicare and Medicaid
programs). We think there’s no need for prior approval.”179
As it turns out, the changes did not discourage PhRMA from filing
another suit against Maine, seeking to force the State to submit its
program to the Secretary of Health for approval and also to enjoin it from
implementing Maine Rx Plus pending the Secretary’s review.180 This
time, however, the district court denied PhRMA the injunction.181 The
court accepted Maine’s reasoning that since Maine changed its statute,
PhRMA’s claims were not yet ripe for review; especially considering
that the new statute would not impose the prior approval provisions of
the statute against nonparticipating drugs until October of 2005.182 Such
a holding does not, of course, definitively decide the validity of Maine’s
program. However, it may foreshadow a subtle shift in the district court’s
view of programs like Maine Rx Plus. Only time will tell.
2. The spread of Maine Rx Plus
Other developments since Walsh are much more positive for state
176. Meg Haskell, Maine Rx Plus Ready to Roll: 275,000 Eligible for Discount Drugs,
BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Jan. 14, 2004, at A1, available at http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=
529012371&sid=2&Fmt=3&clientid=9338&RQT=309&VName=PQD.
177. The financial eligibility requirements under the new law are quite generous, much more
so than for Medicaid enrollment. The statute extends eligibility to all residents who are 350% above
the federal poverty level, or whose unreimbursed prescription drug costs total 5% of family income,
or whose total unreimbursed medical expenses equal 15% or more of family income ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22 § 2681 (2)(F) (West Supp. 2005).
178. Haskell, supra note 176.
179. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
180. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Nicholas, 353 F. Supp. 2d 231, 232 (D. R.I. 2005).
181. See id. at 246.
182. See id. at 239–46.
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healthcare reform. In particular, the State of California is currently
considering adopting a drug benefit program very similar to Maine Rx
Plus.183 Perhaps this development in the nation’s most populous state
indicates that States have been emboldened by the plurality’s decision in
Walsh, and are beginning to more fully exercise their police powers, now
that they are free to do so without the fear of at least a dormant
Commerce Clause challenge, and perhaps even some preemption
challenges as well.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the plurality’s reasoning in Walsh rests on a flawed
procedural foundation, the future of healthcare reform is brighter because
of its decision. The sustaining of States’ use of their police powers to
provide for the healthcare needs of their uninsured populations can only
be a good thing, even despite technical inaccuracies that should have
rendered a different decision.
Who is to say what the true effects of that decision will be? Walsh
will at least stem some of the massive growth in prescription drug costs
in certain jurisdictions, which may, in turn, improve overall health
through the improvement of early access to necessary medications by
those who could not otherwise afford them, and are otherwise ineligible
for Medicaid. But maybe its influence will reach even further. Perhaps
programs like Maine Rx Plus will be models for future programs that
cover ambulatory care by promoting the solicitation of “rebates” from
HMO’s, MCO’s and hospitals. Walsh allows States to use those tools at
their disposal to provide for those who cannot afford health insurance or
other drug benefits. Maybe, by reaffirming the use of police powers in
fostering programs like Maine Rx Plus, Walsh will be the first of the
necessary catalysts that will allow a jump to universal healthcare.184
183. Jeff Tuttle, Rx Plans Compete on Ballot in Calif.: One Initiative Like Maine Rx Plus,
BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Sept. 30, 2005, at A1, available at http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=
529012371&sid=2&Fmt=3&clientid=9338&RQT=309&VName=PQD.
184. For the purposes of this note, I operate from the premise that universal healthcare is a
desirable goal. I recognize, however, that the debate on the desirability and feasibility of universal
healthcare is complex and often heated, and as such, a significant treatment of this topic is well
beyond the scope of this note. For an interesting look at arguments concerning these issues, see
James B. Roche, Health Care in America: Why We Need Universal Health Care and Why We Need
It Now, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1013 (2001) (discussing arguments in favor of universal health
care); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Why Can’t We Do What They Do? National Health Reform Abroad,
32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 433 (2004) (examining European universal health care models and how they
facilitate similar reforms in the U.S.); William P. Gunnar, The Fundamental Law That Shapes the
United States Health Care System: Is Universal Health Care Realistic Within the Established
Paradigm?, 15 ANNALS HEALTH L. 151 (2006) (analyzing the feasibility of movement toward
universal health care in the U.S.).
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Wherever Walsh may lead in the future, in situations like this, I find it
interesting that members of the Supreme Court can make the right
decision, even when it is “wrong.”
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